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This paper surveys a range of constructions in which prosody affects
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1 Introduction
As semanticists have repeatedly demonstrated over the past twenty years, in-
tonation often conveys information important for determining the content of a
discourse. Intonation is important for marking focus, which in turn is impor-
tant for interpreting sentences with focus sensitive adverbs like even and only.
Intonation is also important in marking the discourse function of utterances in
discourse and dialogue. For example, intonation is an essential clue in deter-
mining whether an assertion can function as an answer to a question given in
prior discourse. The canonical way of presenting an answer to a question such
as (1-a) is to place the nuclear pitch accent on the constituent that replaces
the wh-particle, as in (1-b). Alternative realizations of the same sentence are
anomalous, as shown in (1-c).
∗ We would like to thank the audiences at Sinn und Bedeutung 9 (Nijmegen), LENLS 2005
and 2006 (Kitakyushuu, Tokyo), CSSP 2005, the 42nd meeting of the Chicago Linguistic
Society, and Sinn und Bedeutung 11 (Barcelona) for commenting on various aspects of the
work presented in this paper.
Interdisciplinary Studies on Information Structure 08 (2007): 1–38
Ishihara, S., S. Jannedy, and A. Schwarz (eds.):
c  2007 Nicholas Asher and Brian Reese2 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
(1) a. A: Who loves Mary?
b. B: [Jackie]F loves Mary
c. B: #Jackie loves [Mary]F
Asher (1995) and Txurruka (1997) investigate similar intonational cues to dis-
course relations in detail within the formal theory of discourse interpretation
known as Segmented Discourse Representation Theory or SDRT, and many oth-
ers have investigated the topic in other frameworks (Ward and Hirschberg 1985,
Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg 1990, B¨ uring 2003, a.o.).
The present paper explores another way in which intonation contributes to
conveyed content. Sometimes in a discourse or dialogue a single locutionary act
corresponds to two (or more) illocutionary acts. Furthermore, these illocution-
ary acts are ordinarily conveyed by utterances with incompatible semantic types
(Asher and Lascarides 2001). We refer to such locutions as complex speech acts.
Indirect requests, as in (2-a), are a prime example (Searle 1975).
(2) a. Could you please pass the salt?
b. Do you (#please) speak Arabic?
(2-a) is syntactically an interrogative, and therefore – by the conventional asso-
ciation of clause type and discourse function – asks a question. We also have
independent evidence that (2-a) asks a question, since one can reply yes to (2-a)
and to (2-b), but not to direct requests like (3):
(3) Pass the salt
Nevertheless, (2-a) also functions as a request; the adverb please in (2-a), which
marks polite requests, does not normally occur in neutral questions, as shown
by (2-b).Biased Questions 3
Indirect requests are not the only kind of complex speech act. In this pa-
per, we discuss a range of interrogative sentences which we argue function as
both questions and assertions, and in which prosody – intonational phrasing,
intonation, stress – often has important interpretive effects. We refer to these
constructions as biased questions, as they convey an expectation, or bias, on the
part of the speaker toward a speciﬁc answer to the question. We show in §3 that
biased questions convey an assertion.
Examples of the types of interrogatives that we investigate are provided in
(4) – (6). Tag questions, as in (4), provide a natural starting point, as they wear
their illocutionary force(s) on their sleeves, so to speak.
(4) a. Jane isn’t coming, is she?
b. Jane is coming, isn’t she?
As a matter of clausal syntax, tag questions possess both declarative and in-
terrogative components. It is not unexpected, then, that they have properties of
both assertions and questions. However, a number of more nuanced issues arise
regarding their interpretation. First, tag questions are not always biased. Sec-
ond, the discourse function of the interrogative component is inﬂuenced by the
ﬁnal pitch movement over the tag.
Negative polar questions as in (5) are also biased toward a speciﬁc an-
swer (Ladd 1981, van Rooy and ˇ Saf´ aˇ rov´ a 2003, Romero and Han 2004, Reese
2006a).
(5) a. Isn’t Jane coming too?
b. Isn’t Jane coming either?
We argue below that on the so-called “outside-negation” reading in (5-a) (cf.
Ladd 1981) negative polar questions do consist, at least in part, of an assertion.
We link the biased reading of negative polar questions to the neutral reading4 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
of tag questions and discuss the weaker form of bias present on the so-called
“inside-negation” reading, (5-b).
Finally, the examples in (6) each convey a bias toward a negative answer.
Since Borkin (1971), negative bias has been linked to the presence of a strong
negative polarity item (NPI) (cf. Ladusaw 1979, Krifka 1995, van Rooy 2003,
Guerzoni 2004, also).
(6) a. Did John lift a ﬁnger to help Mary?
b. Is John EVER going to help Mary?
c. Did I TELL you writing a dissertation would be easy?
Butitalsooccurswhenaweak NPIlikeanyoreverispronouncedwithemphatic
stress, as in (6-b), and in certain examples of narrow focus, as in (6-c) from
Sadock (1971). As far as we know, the examples in (6) have not received a
uniﬁed account (see Asher and Reese (2005) for a recent attempt). It seems to
us that such an account is desirable and we attempt to provide one here.
In broad terms, our account of bias is couched in a theory of the alignment of
linguistic form and illouctionary force. That is, our account of biased questions
is framed within a linguistic theory of speech acts, as supplied by SDRT. Many
aspects of linguistic form contribute to the determination of discourse function,
including:
• clausal syntax and semantics,
• speciﬁc lexical choices,
• phonology
We are interested, in particular, in how phonology interacts with lexical and
compositional semantics to inﬂuence the rhetorical role an utterance plays in a
discourse or dialogue. Aspects of phonology relevant to interpretation includeBiased Questions 5
ﬁnal tune and nuclear pitch accent (or focus). The former is normally taken to
signal some relation between the speaker, the underlying propositional content
of an utterance and the common ground or the public commitments of various
discourse participants (Gussenhoven 1984, Steedman 2000, Gunlogson 2003,
Marandin et al. 2005). The latter contributes information structural information,
for example by marking information as given or new, in addition to introducing
a set of alternative propositions.
We provide a formal model of complex speech acts using an extension of
type theory proposed in Asher and Pustejovsky (2004) and a theory of dis-
course interpretation, viz. SDRT. SDRT distinguishes many relational types of
speech act (like answers)and provides a good framework for analyzing complex
speech acts. In particular, it distinguishes a number of types of questions that
will prove useful here. For example, while many people have recognized that
there are speech acts like acknowledgements that are a subspecies of assertions,
SDRT postulates that for each such type of speech act, there is a corresponding
question form—a question whose goal is to elicit an acknowledgement from
the other discourse participants. We provide an analysis of the constructions in
(4) – (6), focusing on the interaction of intonation, prosody and syntax, in the
promotion of bias and the computation of the rhetorical role of complex speech
acts.
2 Kinds of Biased Questions
The present section offers more detail on the constructions introduced in §1.
2.1 Tag Questions
Although English tag questions have received a lot of attention in descriptive
grammars of English (Quirk et al. 1985, Huddleston and Pullum 2002) and from
syntacticians (Culicover 1992), there has been relatively little formal semantic6 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
and pragmatic work, and certainly little or no recent work.1 Nevertheless, tag
questions provide an interesting case in which intonation contributes to what is
said.
Syntactically, tag questions consist of a declarative clause paratactically re-
lated to a reduced interrogative clause, or tag, as in (4) from §1. While these
surface syntactic features certainly contribute to the presence of both an asser-
tion and a question in discourse logical form, (i) they do not guarantee it, and
(ii) they do not provide any information about the speciﬁc rhetorical contribu-
tion of the tag.2 We maintain that certain lexical and phonological cues provide
information for the computation of more ﬁne-grained discourse functions.
We assume the model of intonational tunes assumed by the To(nes) and
B(reak) I(ndices) labelling conventions (Beckman and Elam 1997). In ToBI, in-
tonational tunes consist of strings of tones constructed on the basis of a simple
generative grammar. An intonational phrase consists of one or more interme-
diate phrases followed by a boundary tone, L% or H%, and an intermediate
phrase consists of one or more pitch accents followed by a phrase accent L-
or H-. ToBI assumes ﬁve pitch accents: L*, H*, L+H*, L*+H, H*+!H. Pitch
accents are tones aligned with stressed syllables. Given this background, there
are two phonological distinctions relevant to the understanding the meaning and
use of tag questions.
First, the sequence of phrase accent and boundary tone, i.e. ﬁnal falling
vs. ﬁnal rising intonation, on the tag has been claimed to have important inter-
pretive effects (cf. Rando 1980, Quirk et al. 1985, Huddleston and Pullum 2002,
a.o.).3 Most, if not all, descriptions of tag questions note this fact and associate
1 Older treatments of the semantics and pragmatics of tag questions include Sadock (1974),
Millar and Brown (1979), Rando (1980), Ladd (1981).
2 The most one could claim is that the presence of the assertion blocks the default commu-
nicative goal associated with questions, viz. to know an answer.
3 It is an empirical question about how best to characterize the ﬁnal vs. rise distinction. For
example, Gunlogson (2003) distinguishes between falling vs. non-falling. As a result, she
includes ﬁnal plateaus, i.e. H-L% sequences, with rises. We ignore these issues here andBiased Questions 7
some interpretation with the fall vs. rise distinction. Descriptions of these in-
terpretations are remarkably consistent between researchers and we have no
reason to dispute them here. Tag questions with falling intonation ask for ac-
knowledgment from the addressee that the communicative goal of the anchor
has been achieved, cf. Huddleston and Pullum (2002) for example. In SDRT,
this communicative goal is called a speech-act related goal,o rSARG and is an
important element in computing which discourse relations hold between dis-
course constituents of a dialogue. The SARG of a declarative anchor is simply
belief transfer, i.e. that the addressee come to believe the truth of the anchor.
The simple constructed dialogue in (1) provides an illustration. Imagine that
A and B are trying to complete some task at which neither is proﬁcient, but at
which Julie is known to be. We adopt the orthographic convention of indicat-
ing a ﬁnal fall with a period, and a ﬁnal rise with a question mark—hence the
particular orthography of ((1-b)).
(1) a. A: [Julie]CF wouldn’t do it that way.
b. B: Well, Julie isn’t here, / is she.
B’s utterance (1-b) does not express any doubt regarding the truth of the anchor,
but rather is used to get A to acknowledge that Julie is not present (and therefore
that how Julie would accomplish the task is irrelevant to the present situation).
As described above, this use of a tag question stands in a close correspondence
tothe SDRTrelationAcknowledgment, whichdeﬁnes atype ofrelational speech
act. Acknowledgment holds when an utterance entails that the SARG of the
utterance to which it is attached has been achieved. In SDRT, for any discourse
relation R, Rq relates α and β just in case any answer γ to β entails that R(α,γ).
Thus, when a question is used to elicit an acknowledgement as in the case of the
tag in ((1-b), we use the relation Acknowledgmentq to specify its contribution
follow Gunlogson in drawing the line between falling and non-falling tunes.8 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
as a speech act.
Tag questions with ﬁnal rising intonation are still biased toward an answer
that conﬁrms the content of the anchor, yet express some uncertainty or doubt
on the part of the speaker. The dialogue in (2) illustrates this phenomenon.
(2) a. A: Can Julie do it for us?
b. B: Julie isn’t here, / is she?
B’s turn in (2-b) conveys a belief that Julie is not present (and thus answers
A’s question). The tag itself, however, expresses doubt or uncertainty, i.e. the
speaker is open to the possibility that he is wrong. On this use the tag acts as
a request for conﬁrmation of the anchor. If the addressee has evidence to the
contrary, he should provide it; if not, then he should acknowledge the truth of
the anchor. We capture this reading via the SDRT relation Conﬁrmationq.
Bothoftheseinterpretationsarebiased,inthattheanchorisasserted(seethe
forthcoming discussion in §3). This fact blocks the default intention associated
with the interrogative component of the utterance, viz. to know an answer. But
tag questions can function as neutral requests for information, as shown in (3).
(3) a. A: We need to ﬁnd somebody who has done this before.
b. B: Julie isn’t here = is she?
Several aspects of linguistic form appear to be necessary for a neutral read-
ing to arise. First, they only appear to be possible when the anchor contains a
negation and when there is little or no rhythmic break between the anchor and
the tag (Ladd 1981, McCawley 1988, Huddleston and Pullum 2002). Moreover,
the anchor of a neutral tag question is more likely to contain a H- phrase accent.
Ladd (1981) refers to the tag questions in (1-b) and (2-b) as nuclear tag
questions, indicated by placing a slash between the anchor and the tag, and to
the neutral reading in (3) as a postnuclear tag question, indicated with an equalsBiased Questions 9
sign. Ladd’s description of postnuclear tag questions corresponds in the ToBI
scheme to an utterance consisting of a single intonational phrase, which itself
consistsofasingleintermediatephrase(andaboundarytone).Thenuclearpitch
accent, i.e. the last pitch accent in the intermediate phrase occurs somewhere in
the anchor. On this view, there is no pitch accent on any element of the tag
itself. Nuclear tag questions then might consist of either two complete intona-
tional phrases, or one, which itself contains two intermediate phrases. We ﬁnd
this description of postnuclear tags dubious. It is difﬁcult in our experience not
to hear a pitch accent on the auxillary verb in the tag. Of course, one could posit
the existence of postnuclear pitch accents (which is what Ladd appears to have
in mind), but this is a controversial claim. We do, however, agree with Ladd and
other authors, notably McCawley (1988) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002),
that neutral readings of tag questions contain a weaker boundary between the
anchor and tag than nuclear tag questions. For these reasons, we prefer to recast
the nuclear/postnuclear distinction in terms of intonational phrasing as follows:
nuclear tag questions consist of two complete intonational phrases, one for the
anchor and one for the tag. Postnuclear tag questions consist of one intonational
phrase that is constructed from two intermediate phrases for the anchor and tag.
We sketch an analysis below in which these prosodic differences conspire with
syntax and semantics to yield two speech acts or one. In either case, the com-
putation of the discourse function of the tag relative to the anchor procedes in
much the same fashion. However, postnuclear prosody allows a neutral inter-
pretation that nuclear prosody does not.
2.2 Negative Polar Questions
Standard semantic treatments of interrogative sentences predict that positive
and negative polar questions such (4-a) and (5-a) are equivalent. On these ap-
proaches questions partition the space of logical possibilities, each element of10 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
the partition being a proposition expressing a direct answer to the question (cf.
Groenendijk and Stokhof 1997). At ﬁrst glance, the prediction appears to be
correct; the same propositions count as direct answers to both types of interrog-
ative, as shown by the simple yes and no answers to (4-a) and (5-a) below.
(4) a. A: Is Jane coming?
b. B: Yes, she is. ( = Jane is coming.)
c. B: No, she isn’t. ( = Jane is not coming.)
(5) a. A: Isn’t Jane coming?
b. B: Yes, (of course) she is. ( = Jane is coming.)
c. B: No, she isn’t. ( = Jane is not coming.)
However, negative polar questions differ from positive polar questions in
two important respects. First, all negative questions convey a backgrounded at-
titude on the part of the speaker toward the proposition expressed by a positive
answer (Ladd 1981, B¨ uring and Gunlogson 2000, Han 2002, van Rooy and
ˇ Saf´ aˇ rov´ a 2003, Romero and Han 2004, Reese 2006a). (6-b), for example, is a
felicitous continuation of (6-a), which conveys a stance of epistemic neutrality
by the speaker toward the issue raised by the question. (6-c) is infelicitous in the
same context, as it conveys a prior belief toward the issue raised by the ques-
tion that conﬂicts with the neutrality required by the context, namely that the
president read (or ought to have read) the brieﬁng.
(6) a. I have no beliefs on the matter. I just want to know...
b. Did the President read the August 6 PDB?
c. #Didn’t the President read the August 6 PDB?
The second respect in which positive and negative polar questions diverge
is that negative questions are ambiguous in a way that positive questions are
not (Ladd 1981, B¨ uring and Gunlogson 2000, Huddleston and Pullum 2002,Biased Questions 11
Romero and Han 2004). The two interpretations available to negative polar
questions are disambiguated by including either a positive or negative polarity
item. Negative questions that contain a PPI, as in (7), are biased toward posi-
tive answers. Ladd (1981) dubs this interpretation the outside-negation reading.
Negative questions that contain an NPI, as in (8), on the other hand, are biased
toward negative answers, Ladd’s inside-negation reading.
(7) a. Didn’t Kim read the report too?
b. Aren’t there some vegetarian restaurants around here?
(8) a. Didn’t Kim read the report either?
b. Aren’t there any vegetarian restaurants around here?
We argue in §3 that outside- and inside-negation polar questions are not
“biased” in the same sense. In the latter case, it might be more approriate to
claim that inside-negation polar questions are only felicitous in a context that is
biased toward a negative answer (B¨ uring and Gunlogson 2000), rather than to
claim that the question itself is biased. Outside-negation polar questions like
those in (7), we shown, involve an assertion, i.e., they are complex speech
acts, whereas inside-negation negative questions as in (8) do not. We argue
that outside-negation, like negation in the anchor of a neutral tag question, is
metalinguistic.
2.3 Emphatic Focus Questions
Questions that contain a strong NPI, like those in (9), convey a bias toward a
negative answer. Of the sentence types we consider in this paper, these have
received the most attention from formal semanticists (cf. Abels 2003, Asher
and Reese 2005, Borkin 1971, Guerzoni 2004, Krifka 1995, Ladusaw 1979,
van Rooy 2003).12 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
(9) a. Did Fred contribute a red cent to the campaign?
b. Did John lift a ﬁnger to help Mary?
c. Does Fred do a damn thing at the ofﬁce?
d. Did Mary bat an eye when you threatened her?
Most of these analyses center around the semantic properties of polarity items,
i.e. their lexical semantics, in combination with certain well-attested pragmatic
principles. Krifka (1995) is the ur-paper in this respect. (van Rooy (2003) and
Guerzoni (2004), for example, follow Krifka, at least in broad outline, in their
analyses.)
But there is an underlying respect in which these accounts are intonational.
Krifka (1995) is explicit about this, noting that since NPIs introduce alternatives
over the denotation of the NPI, they resemble “items in focus”. Krifka also notes
that strong NPIs necessarily require “emphatic focus”, which he associates with
an emphatic assertion operator that mirrors the semantic effects of the focus
sensitive lexical item even, whose meaning others, notably van Rooy (2003)
and Guerzoni (2004) (following Heim 1984), assume is shared (at least in part)
by NPIs. This raises the question of whether it is the semantics of strong NPIs
which is responsible for bias, or whether certain the phonetic properties of the
nucelar pitch accent are primarily responsible. The examples in (9), which we
used to introduce the phenomena of negative bias, all contain strong NPIs. Con-
sequently, the presence of such lexical items appears to be a sufﬁcient condition
for bias to exist.
But, we argue, it is not a necessary condition. Questions with domain widen-
ers such as any and ever are neutral, unless read with the same emphatic stress
as the minimizers in (9), as demonstrated by the minimal pair in (10-a) and
(10-b) and the similar pair in (11). The existence of minimal pairs like those in
(10-a)/(10-b) suggests that intonation plays some role in the derivation of bias.Biased Questions 13
(10) a. Did Fred contribute anything to the campaign?
b. Did Fred contribute ANYthing to the campaign?
(11) a. Has John ever voted for a democrat?
b. Has John EVER voted for a democrat?
More interestingly, “emphatic” intonation alone produces negative bias, as
in (12-b) and (13) (from Sadock 1971). Both of these examples have narrow
focus, intuitively a L* or L*+H nuclear pitch accent, on the matrix verb.4
(12) a. Do you need that porkchop?
b. Do you NEED that porkchop?
(13) Did I TELL you that writing a dissertation was going to be easy?
(12) and (13) show that the presence of a strong NPI (or even an emphatically
stressed domain widener) is not necessary for a question to be negatively biased.
Rather, the foregoing discussion, we believe, establishes that intonation is the
prime mover in deriving the bias in (9) – (13). And while it is tempting to adopt
Krifka’s analysis in terms of emphatic assertion, we note that it is insufﬁcient, as
it does not establish the existence of an assertion, which we argue is necessary
given the evidence presented in §3.
4 The location of the nuclear pitch accent need not fall on the matrix verb, nor be “narrow” in
the usual sense. Take the example in (i) in which the nuclear pitch accent falls on writing,o r
(ii) in which the nuclear pitch accent occurs in an unmarked position.
(i) Did I tell you that WRITING a dissertation was going to be easy?
(ii) Did I tell you that writing a dissertation was going to be EASY?
Both (i) and (ii) expect a negative answer. (i) might be plausibly followed up by an utterance
by the same speaker such as No, I told you that defending it would be easy. Likewise (ii)
could be followed by No, I told you that it’s not as hard as most people think.14 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
3 Evidence for Multiple Speech Acts
Sadock (1971, 1974) provides several diagnostic tests for illocutionary force
that appeal to the selectional constraints of speciﬁc discourse markers. The sen-
tence initial parentheticals after all and yet take assertions as arguments, for
example, but not neutral questions. After all collocates with assertions, for in-
stance, but not neutral questions, as shown in (1-a) and (1-b) respectively.
(1) It’s ﬁne if you don’t ﬁnish the article today.
a. After all, your adviser is out of the country.
b. #After all, is your adviser out of the country?
Likewise, utterances preﬁxed with yet can follow assertions, cf. (2-b), but not
neutral questions, as in (3-b).
(2) a. John is always late for work.
b. Yet, he continues to be promoted.
(3) a. Is John always late for work?
b. #Yet, he continues to be promoted.
There are parallel tests for questions. Sadock (1971, 1974) notes that sen-
tence-initial tell me and the expression by any chance occur with questions, but
not assertions, as established in (4) and (5).
(4) a. #John, by any chance, owns a car.
b. Does John, by any chance, own a car?
(5) a. #Tell me, John owns a car.
b. Tell me, does John own a car?Biased Questions 15
Furthermore, tell me and by any chance also distinguish between distinct sub-
typesofquestion.Tellme–asasimplerequestforaresponsefromtheaddressee
– selects for any type of question. By any chance, on the other hand, as an
expression of epistemic uncertainty, only selects neutral questions. As such, it
does not appear with biased questions, which we believe convey a commitment
by the speaker.
In the following subsection, we apply these tests to the constructions dis-
cussed in the previous section, establishing that they instantiate complex speech
acts with constituent types question and assertion.
3.1 Tag questions
3.1.1 Nuclear tag questions
Unsurprisingly, nuclear tag questions involve both an assertion and a question
according to Sadock’s diagnostics. (6) and (7) show that nuclear tag questions
assert the anchor, according to the after all test. (6-b) and (7-b) can be pro-
nounced either with a ﬁnal rise or ﬁnal fall, something we note as ’./?’
(6) a. A: The conference should be exceptional this year.
b. A: After all, Julie is coming / isn’t she ./?
(7) a. A: The conference might be sub-par this year.
b. A: After all, Julie isn’t coming / is she ./?
The examples in (8-a) and (8-b), on the other hand, show that nuclear tag ques-
tions are not neutral questions, as they do not pass the by any chance test, but
that they are questions, since they do pass the tell me test.
(8) a. Tell me, Jane {is/isn’t} coming / {isn’t/is} she ./?
b. #Jane {is/isn’t} coming, by any chance / {isn’t/is} she ./?16 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
3.1.2 Postnuclear tag questions
Postnuclear tag questions exhibit more variation in use than nuclear tag ques-
tions.
Postnuclear tag questions with a positive anchor share the discourse func-
tions of nuclear tag questions: they are assertions, as shown by (9) and (10), and
(tell me) questions, (11). They are not neutral questions, however, as demon-
strated by (12).
(9) a. A: Why is Nicholas so sure the conference will be dull?
b. A: After all, Julie is coming=isn’t she ./?
(10) a. A: Pascal’s not coming, so why is Nicholas so sure the conference
will be a success?
b. A: After all, Julie isn’t coming {#too/either}=is she ./?
(11) Tell me, Jane {is/isn’t} coming={isn’t/is} she ./?
The inclusion of a positive polarity item in a postnuclear tag question with a
negative anchor coerces a neutral question reading for examples like (13). The
anchor is no longer asserted under these circumstances, as established by the
neutral question test in (10-b).5
(12) #Jane is coming, by any chance=isn’t she?
(13) Jane isn’t coming {too/#either}, by any chance=is she?
The disambiguating role of the PPI is an important clue to understanding how
thisneutralreadingarises.Webelievethatthenegationintheseexamplesscopes
over the speech act itself, i.e., that it is a sort of metalinguistic operator. Met-
alinguistic negation, as has been noted by Horn (1989), neither licenses NPIs,
nor anti-licenses PPIs.
5 Neutral readings of postnuclear tag questions normally contain ﬁnal rising intonation.Biased Questions 17
3.2 Negative polar questions
According to Sadock’s diagnostics, outside-negation negative questions are as-
sertions, while inside-negation NIs are not. Note that (14-b) can be preceded by
after all when it contains the PPI too, but not when it contains the NPI either.
Either version of (14-b) is felicitous in the discourse context established in (14)
if after all is left off.
(14) a. A: Sue can’t attend, so there’ll be no syntacticians there.
b. B: What do you mean? After all, isn’t Jane coming {too/#either}?
Similarly, (15-b) can follow (15-a) when it contains too, but not when it contains
either.
(15) a. A: Isn’t Jane coming {too/*either}?
b. A: Yet, Mary claims there will be no syntacticians there.
Again, if yet is left off of (15-b), then either the outside- or inside-negation read-
ing of (15-a) is available. Because outside-negation negative questions pass the
after all and yet tests, we maintain that they characteristically make assertions.
This is not true of inside-negation questions.
Outside- and inside- negation negative questions, however, are still ques-
tions: they can be answered with yes or no and they co-occur with the discourse
marker tell me.
(16) Tell me, isn’t Jane coming {too/either}?
Outside-negation negative questions, consequently, are both questions and as-
sertions, as demonstrated by the discourse in (17). The tell me preﬁxed to the
utterance in (17-a) requires it to be a question.18 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
(17) a. A: Tell me, isn’t Jane coming too?
b. A: Yet, Mary claims there will be no syntacticians there.
At the same time, the yet preﬁxed to (17-b) requires (17-a) to be an assertion. As
a result, in order for the the typing constraints of tell me and yet to be satisﬁed
in (17), the negative interrogative in (17-a) must be simultaneously typed as
an assertion and question. In other words, the type associated with (17-a) is
complexinjustthesamewayasindirectspeechactslike(2-a)are;theycombine
two speech acts in one.
3.3 Emphatic focus questions
Finally, applying the tests to the type of interrogative sentences exempliﬁed in
(6) shows that they too are complex speech acts, as shown in (18) – (22) from
Asher and Reese (2005).
(18) a. After all, does John lift a ﬁnger to help around the house?
b. Does John lift a ﬁnger to help around the house? Yet you continue
to reward him.
c. Does John, by any chance, lift a ﬁnger to help around the house?
d. Tell me, does John lift a ﬁnger to help around the house?
(19) I don’t understand why you think that John is a liberal.
a. After all, has he EVER voted for a democrat?
b. #After all, has he ever voted for a democrat?
(20) a. Has John EVER voted for a democrat? Yet you still claim that he
is a liberal.
b. #Has John ever voted for a democrat? Yet you still claim that he is
a liberal.
(21) a. Has John, by any chance, EVER voted for a democrat?Biased Questions 19
b. Tell me, has John EVER voted for a democrat?
(22) [Nicholas is reaching for the last porkchop, after already having had
three.]
a. You should have some fruit instead. After all, do you NEED that
porkchop?
b. Tell me Nicholas, do you NEED that porkchop?
Again, it is not the case that the illocutionary force of these questions is am-
biguous or underdertermined. Rather, it is overdetermined. Biased questions are
simultaneously assertions and questions as shown by (23).
(23) After all, has John by any chance EVER voted for a democrat?
Assuming that the arguments to after all and by any chance must be restricted
to assertions and questions respectively, then both types must be available in the
discourse context, otherwise a type clash should arise in (23), resulting in a kind
of zeugmatic effect.
4 Toward an Analysis of Bias
The present section provides an outline of an analysis of bias within Segmented
Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT: Asher and Lascarides 2003).6 SDRT
is a dynamic semantic theory of the interpretation of discourse and dialogue
that takes the rhetorical connections between utterances seriously. A segmented
discourse representation structure, or SDRS, is a triple  A,F,LAST , where:
• A is a set of labels.
• LAST is a label in A (intuitively, this is the label of the content of the last
clause that was added to the logical form); and
6 More details can be found in Reese (in preparation).20 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
•Fis a function which assigns each member of A a formula of the SDRS
language, which includes formulas of some version of dynamic semantics
(DRT, DPL, Update Semantics, Martin L¨ of Type Theory, among others.)
This notion of discourse structure is very abstract and so very general.
To give a feel for the structures posited by SDRT and for its semantic im-
plications about conveyed content, let’s look to the temporal consequences of a
text. the temporal structure of a discourse is more elaborate than what is sug-
gested by the formal semantic analysis of tenses. There are clearly temporal
shifts that show that the treatment of tenses cannot simply rely on the superﬁ-
cial order of the sentences in the text.
(1) a. (π1) John had a great evening last night.
b. (π2) He had a great meal.
c. (π3) He ate salmon.
d. (π4) He devoured lots of cheese.
e. (π5) He then won a dancing competition.
(1-c) – (1-d) provide ‘more detail’ about the event in (1-b), which itself elab-
orates on (1-a). (1-e) continues the elaboration of John’s evening that (1-b)
started, forming a narrative with it (temporal progression). Clearly, the ordering
of events does not follow the order of presentation, but rather obeys constraints
imposed by discourse structure. Thus the eventualities that are understood as
elaborating on others are temporally subordinate to them, and those events that
represent narrative continuity are understood as following each other.
SDRT (Asher 1993, Asher and Lascarides 2003) provides the following dis-
course structure for (1) and permits a proper treatment of the temporal progres-
sion of the text. Here π6 and π7 are discourse constituents created by the process
of inferring the discourse structure. See Asher and Lascarides (2003) for details.
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• A = {π0,π 1,π 2,π 3,π 4,π 5,π 6,π 7}
•F (π1)=Kπ1, F(π2)=Kπ2, F(π3)=Kπ3, F(π4)=Kπ4, F(π5)=Kπ5,
F(π0)=Elaboration(π1,π 6)
F(π6)=Narration(π2,π 5) ∧ Elaboration(π2,π 7)
F(π7)=Narration(π3,π 4)
• last = π5
SDRT contains a logical system for computing discourse structure on the
basis of information available from syntax and compositional and lexical se-
mantics. Our work over the past several years has been to see how intonation
and prosody can be added as information sources to this system. There are two
parts to this logical system—the ﬁrst is a glue logic that contains axioms for
inferring discourse relations between discourse constituents. In view of the fact
that each discourse constituent has a unique label, the axioms exploit informa-
tion about labels that is given by a description of the SDRS   assembled in
the discourse thus far and of the new discourse constituent β to be linked to
some available discourse constituent α in the SDRS. These descriptions spec-
ify discourse structures by saying which constituents are related to which other
constituents and by saying in which constituent that information is to be found.
Thus,abinarydiscourserelationlikeAcknowledgement thatholdsbetweentwo
discourse constituents in an SDRS will be expressed in the description language
as a three place predicate symbol Acknowledgement(α,β,λ), which means that
the constituent labelled by β serves as an acknowledgement to β and that this
information is contained within the formula associated with label λ.
The axioms and rules of the glue logic exploit standard propositional logic
connectives and a weak conditional operator >, which serves to represent de-
feasible rules about discourse structure. The general form of a defeasible rule
about discourse structure is provided below.22 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
• (?(α,β,λ) ∧ Info(α,β, )) >R (α,β,λ)
In words this rule says that if β is to be attached somehow to α in λ and
certain information about α, β and the whole discourse structure   is available,
then normally β is to be attached with R to α in λ. Such normality condition-
als support modus ponens defeasibly. Thus, when the left hand side formula
holds, we can defeasibly infer R(α,β,λ). Asher and Lascarides (2003) give
a complete speciﬁcation of the glue logic, in particular the defeasible conse-
quence relation |∼ . In addition, to compute relations in dialogue SDRT makes
use of an extension of the glue logic to reason about discourse participants’
cognitive states. This logic is called the logic of cognitive modelling. This ex-
tension contains not only predicates relevant to computing discourse structure,
propositional connectives and the weak conditional operator >, but also modal
operators for belief and intention. We will express the contributions of prosody
to computing discourse relations in the various types of biased questions we’ve
described above using both the glue logic and the logic of cognitive modelling.
4.1 Complex speech acts
In §3, we showed that tag questions, outside-negation polar questions, and em-
phatic focus questions involve not only a question, but an assertive component
as well. What we argue in the present section is that biased questions are, in
fact, assigned a complex speech act type by the grammar. Following Asher and
Lascarides (2001), we model complex types using the notion of a dot type in
the sense of (Asher and Pustejovsky 2004). An utterance is a conventionalized
complex speech act (CSA) if,
(a) the grammar assigns it a complex speech act type of the form
s1 • s2, such that s1 and s2 are distinct (incompatible) types of se-
mantic objects; and (b) Gricean-style principles of rationality andBiased Questions 23
cooperativity link the constituent type s1 to the type s2 (Asher and
Lascarides 2003, p. 310).
§3 provided the linguistic evidence that biased questions are assigned a com-
plex speech act type, with a question component and an assertion component.
Moreover, these component types are associated with distinct, incompatible se-
mantic objects. The selectional constraints of the discourse markers mentioned
above provide evidence of this. In addition, most compositional semantic theo-
ries assign the content of assertions and questions distinct, incompatible types
of model-theoretic objects (or context-change potentials in a dynamic setting).
Assertions, for example, are associated with propositions, or sets of possible
worlds, whereas questions are associated with sets of propositions (Hamblin
1973) or propositional concepts (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984). According
to clause (a) in the above quotation, then, biased questions are conventionally
assigned a complex speech act type assertion • question.7
The grammar is able to exploit both of the constituent types of a complex
type in computing the rhetorical contribution of an utterance in a given dis-
course context through a rule of Dot Exploitation. If an utterance β attaches
to an utterance α (with some undetermined rhetorical relation) in the discourse
context λ – written ?(α,β,λ) – and β is assigned a complex type t1 • t2 by
the grammar, then new speech act discourse referents γ1 and γ2 of type t1 and
t2 respectively are introduced. These new discourse referents are related to the
original speech act referent β by a relation O-Elab, or “dot elaboration”.
Clause (b) of the deﬁnition of conventionalized complex speech acts re-
quires that Gricean-style reasoning about rationality and cooperativity link the
constituent types of the complex type. We provide an informal discussion of this
7 According to the quotation from Asher and Lascarides (2003) complex types are asymmetric
based on the ﬂow of information between the constituent types. As we argue below, the
ﬂow of information in biased questions, perhaps counter-intuitively, appears to be from the
assertion to the question. Intuitively, this is because the assertion blocks the default goal
associated with the question, i.e., to know an answer.24 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
reasoning in the subsections below. The requirement is formalized in the coher-
ence constraint on complex types given below (Asher and Lascarides 2001).
C encodes the linguistic competence of the discourse participants. As such, it
contains conventionalized information about the mapping of linguistic form to
compositional and lexical semantics, in addition to the SDRT rules for inferring
rhetorical connections between utterances. R contains axioms for reasoning
about the cognitive states, i.e. the beliefs, intentions and goals, of the discourse
participants, and information from world knowledge.
• Coherence Constraint on Complex Speech Act Types:
Suppose that:
– ?(α,β,λ)
– β : t1 • t2
– O-Elab(β,γ1) ∧ O-Elab(β,γ2)
– γ1 : t1 ∧ γ2 : t2
Then:
R,C,?(α,γ1,λ),?(γ1,γ 2,λ  ),Info(γ1,γ 2)|∼ R(γ1,γ 2,λ  ),
where λ  labels an SDRS that results from attaching γ1 to α in the SDRS
labeled by λ.
The coherence constraint ensures that the constituent types of a complex speech
act are related by a discourse relation R, inferred on the basis of convention-
alized linguistic knowledge and Gricean-style reasoning about rationality and
cooperativity formalized in R.
Before addressing how the constituent types of the biased question that form
the topic of this paper are rhetorically linked, a few more words need to beBiased Questions 25
said about the content of C, R, and what it means for an utterance α to have
the type assertion in SDRT. To reiterate what was said above, C represents the
linguistic competence of the discourse participants; it therefore provides infor-
mation about syntax, phonology, and lexical and compositional semantics, in
addition to information about the semantic contribution of rhetorical relations
and SDRT’s axioms for inferring rhetorical connections between utterances. As
such, C includes the information that the negation in neutral tag questions and
outside-negation polar questions is metalinguistic (however the notion of “met-
alinguistic” is cashed out formally). It also contains information about the in-
tonational tune of an utterance and its interpretation. The direction of the f0
trend at the end of intonational phrases, for example, is often assumed to con-
vey information about the speaker’s relation to a proposition and its relation to
the common ground (Gussenhoven 1984). Along similar lines, the placement
and choice of nuclear pitch accent provides similar information, for example
by marking information as new or backgrounded (Steedman 2000), and by in-
troducing a (partially ordered) set of alternative propositions. Intonation thus
provides the interpreter with a rich source of information for reasoning about
the cognitive state of the speaker, or at least information about the speaker’s
“take” on the contents and structure of the discourse context.
This leads naturally into a discussion of the content of R, a set of axioms for
reasoning about the cognitive states of discourse participants based on what has
been said in the course of a discourse or dialogue and on who said it. There are,
for example, axioms that model Gricean-style reasoning about the rationality
and cooperativity of discourse participants, in addition to axioms that associate,
by default, certain goals with utterances based on their linguistic form. We refer
to these goals as speech act related goals, or SARGs. QRG, for example, states
that the default SARG of a question is that the speaker believe an answer to it.
Known Answers blocks this default inference when the speaker already believes
an answer.26 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
• QRG: Sanswer(α,p) > SARG(α,BS(α)p)
• Known Answers: (Sanswer(α,p) ∧B S(α)p) > ¬SARG(α,BS(α)p)
Finally, we provide a few remarks on what it means in SDRTfor an utterance
to be an assertion. Our characterization of assertions is not controversial, but is
captured in a very speciﬁc way in a discourse-based frameworks like SDRT.
Searle and Vanderveken (1985) provide the following description of assertions:
“the speaker presents a proposition as representing an actual state of affairs in
the world of utterance (p. 37).” In other words, the proposition conveyed by an
assertion should be true. Based on these observations, we provide the deﬁnition
of assertions in (2).
(2) ((R(α,β,λ)∧right-veridical(R))∨(R (β,γ,λ )∧left-veridical(R)))
↔ β: assertion
A right-veridical rhetorical relation is one that entails the content of its right
argument:
R(α,β) → Kβ
A similar deﬁnition holds for left-veridical rhetorical relations. Rhetorical re-
lations like Narration, Explanation, and Correction are examples of right-
veridical and left-veridical relations, and so on our deﬁnition are all kinds of
assertions; relations such as Q-Elab or Narrationq, on the other hand are not
right-veridical. These and similar relations require their right-argument to be a
question.
In the follow sections we discuss how the complex speech act types assigned
to tag questions, outside-negation polar questions and emphatic focus questions
satisfy the coherence constraint on complex types.Biased Questions 27
4.2 Tag Questions
Tag questions may or may not instantiate a complex speech act type. In the
case of nuclear tag questions, we believe, clausal syntax and semantics, intona-
tional phrasing, and the alignment rules of SDRT suggest the presence of two
illocutionary acts: an assertion (based on the declarative anchor) and a question
(derived from the tag). In the case of postnuclear tag questions, it is plausible
to assume a complex type assertion • question. Recall that the discourse func-
tions available to postnuclear tag questions are a super-set of those available to
nuclear tag questions. Whereas, both types of tag question function as requests
for acknowledgment or conﬁrmation, postnuclear tag questions can also func-
tion as neutral questions. The neutral use of postnuclear tag questions, however,
has peculiar lexical semantic properties, viz. the presence of a metalinguistic
negation operator.
The reasoning that links the anchor and tag of a nuclear tag question mirrors
exactly that which links the constituent types of a postnuclear tag question. We
therefore focus on the latter below, since we are interested for the most part in
the analysis of biased questions as complex speech act types. As an illustration,
we focus on the interpretation of tag questions as requests for acknowledge-
ment. This interpretation, recall, is associated with falling intonation over the
tag, a phonological feature that we assume provides no essential semantic in-
formation (cf. Reese and Asher 2006 for more discussion).
The axiom schema in (3) provides (indirectly) the semantic content of the
relation used to model acknowledgement questions. Acknowledgementq links
α to β just in case the answer to β entails that the SARG of α has been accepted
or achieved. This semantic information, we assume, is sufﬁcient to infer that
Acknowledgementq links an utterance to the prior discourse context. This ax-
iom, as part of SDRT’s glue logic, is included in the set of conventional linguistic
information C.28 Nicholas Asher & Brian Reese
(3) Axiom on Acknowledgement Questions:
(?(α,β,λ)∧ SARG(α,φ) ∧ Sanswer(β,p) ∧ (BH(α)(p) > BH(α)φ)) >
Acknowledgementq(α,β,λ)
We sketch below how the coherence constraint on complex types is satisﬁed
for postnuclear tag questions with falling intonation. Importantly, the rhetorical
link between the constituent types follows from compositional semantics and
cognitive modeling alone. Let β be a postnuclear tag question. Assume that
R(α,β,λ)andthatthegrammarassignsβ acomplextypeassertion•question.8
Because ?(α,β,γ) assumes that β has a simple type, the rule Dot Exploitation
is called, yielding:
O-Elab(β,γa) ∧ O-Elab(β,γt),
where γa : assertion gives the semantic contribution of the anchor and γt :
question gives the contribution of the tag. The coherence constraint on complex
types, then, requires a rhetorical link between γa and γt. As we argued above,
the requisite link is one of two relations: Acknowledgementq or Conﬁrmationq.
Because γa is typed assertion, it must attach within λ with a right-veridical
relation – see (2). Given this constraint, the SARG of γa is that the addressee
believe its propositional content. This means that in the schema in (3), φ is
instantiated with BH(γa)(pγa). It also follows from certain axioms of cognitive
modeling that BS(γa)(pγa)9 and from the compositional semantics of questions
and answers that Sanswer(γt,p γa). Finally, it is a theorem of the logic of cogni-
tive modeling that BH(γa)(pγa) > BH(γa)BH(γa)(pγa), as belief is a K45 modality.
As a result, in the absence of conﬂicting information the addressee infers that
Acknowledgementq(γa,γ t,λ  ).
8 The argumentation that follows holds for nuclear tag questions, as well, except that there is
no need in the case of nuclear tag questions to employ Dot Exploitation.
9 For tag questions, S(γa)=S(γt).Biased Questions 29
We do not go into the details of the derivation of conﬁrmation questions
here, except to note that we assume that ﬁnal rises do make a semantic contri-
bution through either a modal expression of uncertainty (ˇ Saf´ aˇ rov´ a 2005), or by
expressing “ownership” in some sense of the underlying proposition expressed
by the utterance (Steedman 2000, Gunlogson 2003). Reese and Asher (2006)
and Reese (in preparation) provide proofs that this information blocks the de-
fault inference to Acknowledgementq. The reason is that the ﬁnal rise commits
the speaker to inconsistent intentions (or, equivalently, SARGs), which we as-
sume is ruled out by principles of rational action (see for example Cohen and
Levesque 1990).
Neutral readings of postnuclear tag questions, as already stated, have a pe-
culiar lexical feature, viz. a metalinguistic negation operator in the anchor. As
such, the computation of their discourse function is a separate matter from that
of the postnuclear tag questions described above. We adopt the analysis of met-
alinguistic negation common to multi-valued logics (see for example Bochvar
1981 as discussed by Beaver and Krahmer 2001) in which ∼ Kπ is equivalent
to ¬(π : assertion), at least with respect to declarative sentences. Given our
characterization of assertion, this means that it is not the case that π attaches to
the discourse context with a right-veridical relation. If π does not attach with a
right-veridical relation, then must attach with a rhetorical relation pertinent to a
neutral question. Note that in the cases discussed above, the association of the
anchor with an assertion blocks the default SARG of a question: if the speaker
(of a tag question) believes the content of the anchor – which follows from cog-
nitive modeling and the fact that it is asserted – then Known Answer will ﬁre
with respect to the tag’s SARG. However, if the anchor contains a metalinguistic
negation operator, the interpreter can no longer infer that the speaker believes
the content of the anchor and there is nothing blocking QRG.
A remaining issue involves the relationship between “postnuclear” intona-
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a neutral interpretation? The answer, we maintain, lies in our assumption that
nuclear phrasing forces two speech act discourse referents, one for the anchor
and one for the tag. Postnuclear phrasing, on the other hand, assigns the tag
question a dot type and Dot Exploitation will ﬁre only if there is a type clash.
This is normally the case, but metalinguistic negation – which forms part of the
linguistic form of all neutral interpretations – cancels the assertion as described
above.
4.3 Outside-Negation Polar Questions
Outside-negation polar questions, unlike their inside-negation counterparts, are
also assigned a complex type assertion • question by the grammar. The con-
nection between the constituent types varies according to the use to which the
utterance is put. Outside-negation polar questions are felicitous in two types of
situation, what Romero and Han (2004) call “contradiction” and “suggestion”
scenarios. In the former situation, outside-negation polar questions are often
prosodically marked in the same way as corrections, in which one ﬁnds some
combination of higher mean pitch, greater pitch range, higher mean intensity
and increased duration on the nuclear pitch accent (Swerts and Krahmer to ap-
pear). (4) provides an example of the contradiction use. A’s turn in (4-a) biases
the context against the proposition that John is in Hawaii.
(4) a. A: John is coming to the party tonight.
b. B: Isn’t John still in Hawaii?
Reese (2006b) provides a number of examples which show that the discourse
function of outside-negation negative polar interrogatives often patterns with
the use of positive assertions as denials. This is to be expected on our analysis,
since we maintain that outside-negation polar questions involve a positive as-
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Dot Exploitation attaches the the preceding discourse context with a divergent
rhetorical relation like Correction or Counterevidence. The presence of this
the assertion requires, on pragmatic grounds, a reinterpretation of what ques-
tion is being asked. A number of possibilities exist for attaching the question
to the assertion. For example, the constituent speech acts may be related via
Acknowledgementq or Conﬁrmationq, as with tag questions. Another possi-
bility is that a stronger relation like Counterevidenceq holds, in which case
the question functions as a challenge to the addressee to back up a previous
commitment by supplying counterevidence to the speakers assertion (see Reese
2006a).
Outside-negation polar questions also occur in neutral contexts, in which
case they function as polite suggestions. (5), where (5-b) serves as an answer to
the question in (5-a), illustrates this use.
(5) a. A: Who wrote Gravity’s Rainbow?
b. B: Wasn’t it Thomas Pynchon?
In this and similar cases, the component assertion, viz. that Thomas Pynchon
wrote Gravity’s Rainbow, attaches to the speech act discourse referent intro-
duced by (5-a) with QAP (Question-Answer Pair), a right-veridical relation.
The question component of the complex speech act type again attaches to the
answer with Acknowledgementq or Conﬁrmationq depending on the certainty
conveyed by B.
4.4 Emphatic Focus Questions
Our treatment of emphatic focus questions is similar to the treatment of outside-
negation polar questions given above. One difference, however, is that emphatic
focus questions involve a negative assertion instead of a positive one. As with
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componentofthecomplextypeassignedtoemaphticfocusquestionsattachesto
the prior discourse context with a divergent rhetorical relation, i.e. Correction
or Counterevidence. With respect to the dialogue in (6) from Asher and Reese
(2005), note that B’s utterance in (6-f) calls into question A’s assertion in (6-a).
(6) a. A: John is a pretty decent husband.
b. B: Does he do the dishes?
c. A: No.
d. B: Does he do the laundary?
e. A: Well... no.
f. B: Does he do a damn thing around the house?
The question intuitively challenges A to either provide counterevidence to B’s
negative assertion (indirectly providing evidence for her original claim in (6-a))
or to explain why they said it in the ﬁrst place. These discourse functions are
captured in SDRT with the relations Counterevidenceq and Explanation
∗
q re-
spectively.
Finally, we note in passing that the intonational properties of emphatic fo-
cusquestionsprovidesupportforthecharacterizationoftheirdiscoursefunction
given above. Emphatic focus, to our ears, is marked with an L*+H nuclear pitch
accent followed by a low-rising ﬁnal tune, a L*+H L-H% contour in the ToBI
framework. Liberman and Sag (1974) refer to this tune as the “contradiction
contour” and Ward and Hirschberg (1985) that this contour – when occurring
with marked spectral features – conveys speaker incredulity. In addition, Steed-
man (2000, 2003) maintains that L*+H marks contested thematic constituents.
This intonational information, in addition to the lexical semantic properties of
strong negative polarity items, most likely played the central role in the gram-
maticization of emphatic focus questions as complex speech acts.Biased Questions 33
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